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
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


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A Criticism of Some Deterministic
Systems in Their Relation to
Practical Problems

BY

JESSE HERRMANN



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A Criticism of Some Deterministic Systems in Their Relation to Practical Problems 181

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE

FACULTY OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

JESSE HERRMANN

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
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I INTRODUCTORY

One of the functions of philosophy is to synthetize the sum total of knowledge. But it must be remembered that philosophy in its essence is not an amanuensis, a tabulator or a reflector. Its enunciation is more important than its formulation; as a vitalizer it is more efficacious than as a systematizer. Even though the philosopher receives his content from the thought and the normal activity of the masses, yet he stands on a unique pinnacle and becomes the true prophet and leader of his age. True philosophy always eventuates in practical consequences. Plato's *Republic* is speculative to the highest degree, yet no one can deny that his ideas have had a marked material influence wherever Greek culture has penetrated. Stoic philosophic thought, in a way easily traceable, became the formative principle underlying much Roman jurisprudence. Among the speculative religious thinkers the classic example is found in John Calvin. He blazed a new trail in religious thought. The results of his rule in Geneva can be measured, but who can compute the practical consequences in education, sociology and politics that his bold and daring conception produced? In the eyes of many Fichte was a dreamer and a spinner of metaphysical webs, but he became the man of the hour when Germany needed practical and resourceful men. There are exceptional men in public life to-day who have never found an hiatus between the retreat of the scholar and the work of the world.

There is no necessary conflict between theory and practice. The successful financier, social worker, or inventor who ignores the work of the speculative thinker is as ignorant and biased as the pseudo-philosopher who has lost sympathy with the doer, and who often despises the day and the man of small things. The Greek geometers out of pure love of knowledge patiently investigated the conic sections, but they never dreamed to what purposes a Newton would apply their conclusions.

Still the criticism of the philosopher has not always been

unmerited. To this day metaphysics has not recovered from the sins of its fruitlessness in the Middle Ages. The Renaissance with its new interest in science and in man, apart from religious considerations, became keenly conscious of the worthlessness of certain types of speculative thought. The new school did not hesitate to press its point of vantage and the old philosophy was brought into thorough disrepute. But philosophy learned its lesson well, and it has guarded its systems with a jealous eye so that they should never again degenerate into mere sesquipedalian verbiage. With the exception of a few thinkers modern philosophy has remained true to her high purpose, and has rigorously insisted that the *terminus ad quem* is nothing less than contact with human life.

But in spite of all this philosophy has not escaped criticism and calumny at the instance of the scientific and business world. The scientist, allied with a materialistic psychology, claims that philosophy arrogates too much to itself when it proceeds to synthesize the data furnished by the sciences and claims to have found a final word or a new whole which can not be equated to the sum of its parts. In a similar way, though with a different purpose, the over confident devotees of so-called practical life have sought to undermine philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Man has discovered more keys to unlock the store-house of nature's power in the last two centuries than our progenitors had discovered in a millennium. An undue excess of creature comforts has lulled the masses to sleep. The world of appreciation and value has been relegated to the limbo of uncertainty and unreality. The individuals in the nation, riveting their gaze on the same object, have become hypnotized; they press forward with lowered head confident of their self-sufficiency and power. They are deaf to the voice of the poet, the preacher and the philosopher, the champions of truth.

Many signs can be adduced which are indubitable proofs of this condition. Just as an individual cannot think and work at the same time, so a nation cannot construct railroads, develop mines, build factories and cultivate the soil and at the same time produce poetry, art, and music. To the student of history it is not strange that America, in her brief childhood days, has produced no immortal art. And if the fine arts thus far have not found congenial soil in American civilization,

much less has philosophy found a hearing. It is no mystery that the busy world should take little stock in the sober thought of the secluded scholar. The man engaged with the concrete thought and act has neither time nor inclination for much abstract thinking. But even the busiest man and the busiest nation love to flatter themselves that they are philosophers or at least that they are on speaking terms with men who know and make philosophy. When they cannot find a system to their taste they begin to make a *Weltanschauung* to their own liking. No better illustration is afforded of this tendency than the pragmatism prevalent in our own day. This secularization of philosophy is fraught with as many dangers to the intellectual life as the secularization of the church is fraught with perils to the religious life. But this is exactly what pragmatic thought indicates. We must get our norms from the mart and the stock exchange.

But no civilization can long continue in the course of material prosperity and concrete thought without eventually developing the most portentous problems. An unpremeditated movement must eventuate in some such way. Suddenly a halt is made and the individual becomes self-conscious. When this self-consciousness comes to the masses a great upheaval follows the restless discontent. The people look on all sides for light and leadership. It is then that the demagogue has his opportunity, for conditions are in unstable equilibrium, and the slightest impact may precipitate the social consciousness into stern fixity. But this malleable situation also receives the arduous attention of sincere reformers who are not qualified by training or temperament to reform the social structure. Thus the market is flooded with ready-made nostrums and panaceas for every ill. This crucial situation also furnishes the golden opportunity for the philosopher, the man of reason, true insight, and discernment.

The most pronounced feature of the last two decades of our history has been its transitional character. A strange sense of insecurity and dissatisfaction pervades every department of life. Witness the disruption in present political allegiance; the revulsion from creed and dogma in religion. These facts indicate that the old order is passing away and that a new alignment must be made. The new *modus vivendi* demands a new *modus operandi*. The work of reconstruction has begun and

it is imperative to inquire whether the plan of the work is based on sound principles.

Broadly speaking, there are two distinct ways in which a society may rehabilitate itself and its members. The first is the internal or dynamic; the second is the external or mechanic. The former seeks to change the environment by changing the individual, the latter tries to change the individual by changing his environment. These two strands can be clearly detected in the history of politics, philosophy and theology.

Philos.
The true defenders of the crown in all ages sincerely believe that the good of the people, the progress of the race and the advancement of civilization can be secured only by creating, as it were, *ab extra* conditions, laws, and environment, which will in turn penetrate the social fabric and renovate the individual member. The champions of constitutional government, on the other hand, maintain that true progress results only when the individual, motivated by self respect and a high ideal, projects himself spontaneously into his outer relations, and thus creates the laws and conditions which obtain in the community in which he lives. History clearly teaches that the latter conception is the true theory of the state.

Philosophy
In philosophy the conflict has been mainly between the idealists and the naturalists. At all times the idealists have been eloquent in asserting the centrality of selfhood. The periphery has significance only as it finds its way back to the center. Not only do all human relations, social, economic and political, get their significance from these self-centers, but even nature and her laws are dependent on the self. Man is not the child of nature; rather say that nature is man's ward. The naturalist, on the other hand, begins with the external world in its larger proportions. He places the accent on phenomena, and with great difficulty he ultimately finds the insignificant creature called man. He studies him with the aid of a microscope, but finds only chemical compounds, atomic motion, nerve energy, and reflex arcs. Man is no more a mystery to him than the crystallization of a diamond. At any moment of time he is the effect of the sum-total of antecedents which obtain in the causal nexus of which he happens to be a part. To him conduct is composed of the same calculable components that explain the path of a moving body. To get any definite reaction, it is only necessary to provide the appro-

prate external stimulus. Provide the right stimuli and the man will turn out good deeds, sweet music, as well as the daily routine. According to this position nature makes man and not man nature.

7
How about middle
nature?

These two threads are no less distinct in theology than they are in politics and philosophy. In most religions, and in Christianity in particular, there has appeared the antinomy between priestism and prophetism, between ritualism and vitalism, between ceremony and sincerity. In a most singular way the priest class and the prophet class flourished in the same religious economy in the Hebrew state. Their ideals and work were distinct and often seemed contradictory. The priest was concerned with the jot and the tittle of the law. He impressed on every member the necessity of conforming to the external rites in order that his present and future condition might be secure. From birth to death the Jew was circumscribed by a law and order superimposed from without. Only by rigorously adhering to every precept of the law could he attain the ideal existence. The message of the prophet had an entirely different content. An Amos or an Isaiah towers above his fellows as a man who saw things in truer proportion; who had communed with God and with himself, and thus felt very deeply the distinction between religious form and religious life. In their estimate religion must make form and not form religion. The following passages strongly emphasize the prophet's protest against the extreme liturgics of his day. "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me. For thou delightest not in sacrifice; else would I give it: Thou hast no pleasure in burnt-offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."¹ Or think for a moment of the high conception of the prophet Micah. "Wherewith shall I come before Jehovah, and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before him with burnt-offerings, with calves a year old? . . . He hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth Jehovah require of thee, but to do justly and to love kindness and to walk humbly with thy God."² This perennial conflict in the Jewish state came to a final issue in the teachings and work of Jesus and Paul. These

theology

¹ Psalm 51:10, 16, 17.

² Micah 6:6, 8.

two masters found no comparable foes among the Pharisees and the Sadducees. The strife was long but the outcome decisive. The obstinacy of the ritualists culminated in the complete disruption of the Jewish commonwealth. It was a great victory for the principle of internalism. At the very beginning of Christianity the proposition was clearly set forth that man was to be regenerated from within and not from without. A new spirit was instilled into the heart of man and not a new shackle placed upon his hand.

It might have been expected that Christianity, founded on a strictly spiritualistic basis and nurtured by men who were loyal to this principle, would have dealt a death blow to the idea that man lives by bread alone. But history speaks to the contrary. The ghost of the Jewish nation was reincarnated in the Christian body. Here is found a significant illustration of the cyclical nature of history. As soon as the Roman Church began to flourish the old conflict was again at hand. Christianity became more and more formal and ritualistic; religion was often conceived as a commercial transaction. But there were never wanting individual champions of a true heart-religion. Space does not permit even to mention the salient facts in this century-long conflict. Such names as Gottschalk, Savonarola, Huss, Zwingli, Calvin, Knox and Luther are eloquent even in their silence. The climax came at the time of the Reformation; but unlike the Jewish controversy the contest was not decisive. The Jewish nation paid the penalty of death, the Roman hierarchy lost many members and much prestige. The conflict between the Romanists and the Protestants to-day is essentially one of method and process in the regeneration of man.

It must be evident that the above discussion has not been a digression from the point at issue. The problem is to find the true method of procedure in the reconstruction of our life and thought. There are two possible lines that may lead to a solution. It has been observed that in all ages and in most realms of life there have been two parties contending for supremacy. It may be of little import to decide which has scored most victories; it is sufficient to know that the strife is perennial.

In reviewing once more the social and political tendencies of the day, it is evident that the externalistic, the collectivistic reconstruction is most prominent. In respect to faith in the

omnipotence of legislation many of our statesmen out-Bentham, Bentham. The *Allmacht* of law is as axiomatic to many people as the law of gravitation. The following statements by Prof. George B. McClellan bring out this thought in bold relief:

"Men have achieved a notoriety which their admirers have believed to be fame, for no better reason than that they have been instrumental in the enactment of statutes designed to abolish most forms of sin by the mere decree that they shall cease to exist."

"Despite this, year after year, our Congress and our Legislatures, with a perseverance and an energy worthy of a better cause, enact statutes by the thousand, all designed with the best will in the world, to bring us a little nearer to perfection, and all due to the prevalent impression that any statute will certainly accomplish the good intended by its authors."

"The extreme of paternalism was reached in the Hepburn Pure Food Act, which subjects all foods, drugs and drinks, including wines, liquors and milk, to government analysis, government regulation and government inspection. The National Government, in other words, undertakes through its power to regulate commerce between the States to secure the citizen a wholesome breakfast, an eatable dinner, a sound glass of champagne and a pure drink of whiskey."^a

The inquiry now is concerning the cause and the significance of the fact that men are surrounded by a network of mechanical laws, which do not emanate from the social consciousness. Why treat man like a machine? Why seek his good as we seek the good of an acre of land?

As to its *significance* few will deny that it is fraught with the greatest dangers. There is imminent peril that man will degenerate into an artificially nurtured creature; that he will lose his initiative and creative impulse. Man can no more develop on moral and legal crutches than the plant or animal can that leans for support on a ready-made environment. The very essence of life and growth is that the living entity persists not only in spite of its environment but that, in a very specific even if only in a limited sense, it creates a new environment.

The twining herbs of the *Cuscuta* genus at the inception of life have all the characteristics of strong independent organisms. They seem potentially endowed to maintain their integ-

^a *Principles in Politics*, pp. 6, 67.

rity. They give promise of better things. But they evidently grow weary in well doing. They send out suckers and draw their sustenance from the sap of other plants. The adult dodder has neither root nor leaf of its own. It has hardly strength enough to support the weight of its own frail stem. When the plant ceases to change the inorganic into the organic it no longer remains *sui generis*. The parasitical sin is to permit 'other' to change 'self' without 'self' changing 'other'. What is true in the vegetable realm is equally true in animal life. Nature has provided the ordinary crab with a good armor plate to protect himself against the buffeting of the sea and the attacks of his enemies. This means of self-protection is nature's reward for long generations of faithful work. But the progenitors of the hermit crab somehow conceived the notion that nature could be improved. They then began to appropriate as implements of defense the cast off weapons of other mollusks. For generations this practice continued, and the result is that the hermit crustacean has only a thin membrane and articulated appendages that are atrophied and rudimentary, where his more faithful brother has a solid integument with strong and fully developed limbs.

The experience of man has not been otherwise. The philosophy or religion that has helped man to find himself has truly helped him to find God and the world. The political, social and economic orders, that have placed a high worth on the individual, have not only benefited the individual but have in turn raised the standard of the political, social and economic orders in which the individual has thus been honored. The charity that aids men to aid themselves is commendable, but the charity that seeks only to change the environment, thus hoping to change the character, is based on a false principle.

The *cause* of our mechanized and legalized society is undoubtedly a more intricate problem than the study of its significance. To ascertain the real physical cause in a phenomenon of nature is difficult enough, but it is almost presumptuous to speak dogmatically about the relation of cause and effect in a phenomenon of social life. The question may be somewhat clarified by distinguishing at the outset between the antecedent conditions that merely obtain and the causes that exist as efficient antecedents. That there is a distinct difference between the two becomes evident after a moment's reflection. Much



explanatory and descriptive matter is confusing because these two concepts are interchangeably used. For example, space is a condition of the material world, but in no sense is space the cause of this existence. Time is a condition of a moving particle but it is not a cause of motion. Sin is a condition of saintliness, but it has never produced a saint.

What then are the *conditions* and the *causes* of the paternalistic tendency in church, state and social life? In this connection I again quote Prof. George B. McClellan:

"The three causes to which may be traced the origin of the collectivist tendency of the present day all began during the era of Benthamism; they were, first, a general belief in the efficacy of legislation to accomplish anything that its authors may desire; second, economic development resulting in the organization of corporations, which carried a popular demand for their regulation; third, the growth and power of the labor movement."⁴

It appears that none of the three so-called causes are causes in the true sense. "A general belief in the efficacy of legislation" is practically the same as a general belief in a "collectivist tendency." Neither explains the other; both must find their *raison d'être* elsewhere. One is no more the cause of the other than one side of an algebraic equation is the cause of the other side. As to corporations and labor organizations, it seems that cause and condition are confused. The new economic phenomena here instanced are part of the assemblage of conditions under which the paternalistic spirit began to operate, but observe that this same spirit is evident in our social, religious and educational reconstruction, quite independent of corporations and labor unions. Therefore it is manifest that a strict causal relation does not obtain between these new economic conditions and the collectivistic faith. The trust and labor problem may have occasioned much legislation, but in no sense does this fact causally explain why there is implicit faith in paternalism.

These same economic facts which have conditioned such a luxurious harvest of legislation have been designated by Prof. Frank A. Fetter as the "Dynamic condition of American industries." For centuries adjustment and adaptation have been going on in European civilization. The social, religious and

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 58.

political grooves have been worn deep by the imperceptible passage of time. It requires almost a catastrophe to change the configuration in any department of life. Tradition and custom exist in such an atmosphere as tenacious conservative forces. In our civilization on the other hand most social and economic factors are in unstable equilibrium. The fertile soil, vast stores of mineral deposits, virgin forests, water power, coupled with the invention of the steamboat, the steam locomotive, and new methods of mining and manufacturing have made the second half of the nineteenth century truly dynamic. Every object to which man turned his attention was found pulsating with energy. But power does not only mean opportunity, it also spells danger. In this period all the dangers have been encountered to which a virile youth is subject whom over indulgent parents have supplied too lavishly with ready cash. These conditions made it imperative that many legitimate safeguards should be enacted in order to preserve the nation as well as the individual. At least a modicum of success can be traced to this method of procedure. But the men of the twentieth century, over emphasizing this success, have assumed as axiomatic that the more life is protected by the strong pinions of the law the safer our commonwealth will be.

Having now pointed out the conditions which have occasioned the unquestionable faith in paternalism, it becomes necessary in the next place to penetrate a little deeper and try to ascertain the fundamental causes, which suggest external remedies for conditions as above outlined, and why we clutch so tenaciously at this method of reconstruction. The answer to these questions briefly stated is as follows:

Both naturalism and theological determinism have conspired to rob man of the reality of selfhood and of his true relation to God. The former makes him a physical automaton; the latter a spiritual automaton. These two systems, in a very subtle and silent way, have dominated our thought, and have been formative principles in the solution of every problem. Here is found the true cause of the externalistic method of dealing with new conditions. Between the two conceptions, that man is only a play thing in the ruthless hands of a cold atomistic world, or the helpless clay fashioned by a creative potter, little room is left to man for self-initiation and self-creation. If man is what these two apparently contradictory and yet in a sense

converging *Weltanschauungen* appear to make him, it is no longer a mystery why we seek to influence him solely by external means,—why man has degenerated into a parasite instead of maintaining his integrity as the acme of nature, and the consummation of God's creative work.

At this stage of the discussion my position must necessarily be set forth in dogmatic and aphoristic statements. It is hoped, however, that dogma will give way to reason, and aphorism to elucidation as the study continues.

In Genesis 1:27 we read: "And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him." Whatever else this statement means, for me it signifies that God gave man not only discursive intelligence, and moral intuition but also a will, which like His own has the power of self-initiation and self-activity. Each self-conscious volition has an element of absolute newness in it. It makes the world other than it would have been, had not the creative self put forth an effort. In this sense creation is continually going on; in this sense a part of God's world is realized only through man. In this conception is found the secret of man's real worth.

The havoc results not so much from the fact that the law maker, the reformer and the pulpiteer are unmindful of these principles as from the fact that the rank and file are not conscious of their own unique powers. In the last analysis it is the sum-total of conviction and appreciation, as created by the many individual consciousnesses and finding embodiment in the genius, that marks the way for progress and the attainment of new truth. The mass-thought makes the master, and in turn the master moulds the mass-thought. This mutual relation and interaction obtains in all progress.

What we then need is not more constraint but more conviction; more self-appraisal in the nobler sense. Legislation and restriction are not unnecessary but these fetters must be self-imposed by a consciousness working from within outward and not from without inward. The greatest work that the philosopher can perform to-day is to apprise man of his true nature. To do this it is imperative to free him from the degrading trammels of naturalism and the lofty slavery of theological determinism. To this task of liberation we shall soon turn.

II THEORY AND PRACTICE

Before we proceed to the critical examination of naturalism and theological determinism, it is important to consider whether there is any vital relation between thought and practice; whether there is warrant for the above assertion regarding the relation between a deterministic world-view and the programme of active life.

Consideration must be given to Martineau's statement: "The real life of men, even upon its inner side, is not shaped by philosophical systems or moved forward on lines of consecutive logic."¹ To the same purport is Sidgwick's well known opinion that practical ethical interests are not vitally influenced by our theory of the will. Such statements are very often distorted and interpreted as if the author intimated that correct thought is not a prerequisite of consistent and correct action. These thinkers never deny that all concrete application of thought to life consciously or unconsciously implies an abstract but rational element. It only means that men often find their system of thought in the application of thought and not vice versa.

A distinction between two kinds of consciousness may clarify our meaning. Intuitional consciousness is that activity of the mind which is spontaneously generated when reality comes in contact with the apprehending mind. Its content is exceedingly complex, containing both feeling and reason. Reflective consciousness, on the other hand, is that activity of the mind which is discursively generated when the content of intuitional consciousness is disintegrated into its constituent elements, and their mutual relations resolved into grounds and consequences. The one is concrete thinking, the other abstract; the one is the "real life of men," the other "philosophical system" and "consecutive logic"; the one is Bismarck and Gladstone, the other Holland and Austin; the one is the poet and the painter, the other the critic and the grammarian. It is the concrete thinker that creates in the arts and makes progress in practical life, but he owes an incalculable debt to the abstract thinker,

¹ *A Study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 196.

who systematizes and preserves the true and the good. In a very real sense, therefore, abstract and theoretical thought becomes the content and guiding principle for the men who frame laws, control industry, and conduct schools and churches.

If it is agreed, then, that the dominant thought of a people is uniquely formative in practical affairs, we are prepared to discuss the more specific problem, namely, the relation of deterministic thought to life.

The most fundamental thing in a man's religious life is his conception of God; the most fundamental thing in his social life is his conception of man. There can be no consistent theory of government, no philosophy of education, no science of philanthropy without a clear conception of the nature of the individual self. And as the estimate of the Ego changes, slowly but surely there is a readjustment in every social² institution. Broadly speaking there are only two conceptions of the self. The first is that the Ego is a product, the second that the Ego is partly product but essentially producer. The one makes the self a creature, the other creature and creator. Of course in no age and in no country is there unanimity as to the nature of the individual. If there were unanimity, all social problems would be much simplified. If man is a product, and if the factors of the product are discernible and subject to manipulation, then the *modus operandi* is a comparatively easy task. Just as the course of a river can be guided by digging and damming so the course of human life, in the individual or in group, is manageable by external means. If man is a resultant of moments under the control of human authorities, then government, education and morality reduce themselves to physics, biology and eugenics. This is the logical outcome of a naturalistic conception of the nature of man.

The most potent influence among any people is religion. Ultimately the kind of Deity a people worships determines the kind of selfhood it attributes to the individual. And the conception of the self becomes structural in the organization of social institutions. In this respect the present age affords no exception. But the influence to-day that is second only to religion is science. And this science is Darwinian in thought

² 'Social' here as elsewhere is used in the comprehensive sense to include politics, economics, education, etc.

and method and naturalistic in its interpretation of reality. Since the publication of the *Origin of Species* every scientific textbook has been rewritten; the principles of ethics have been reformulated; sacred and secular history have been revised. In a very singular way this modern scientific thought has also accented the notion that the self is merely a product of nature. Heredity and environment completely account for the conduct of the individual. It is not strange, therefore, that marked paternalistic tendencies have been displayed in the wake of modern science.

In making the claim that evolutionary naturalism tends to mechanize society, I am not unmindful of Spencer's *Social Organism*. Spencer undoubtedly attempted the most comprehensive and thorough application of evolutionary thought and method. He is the unqualified champion of the *laissez faire* theory of government. The state in its various forms is as much a natural organism as any living being. Parliament is the brain; arteries and veins find their counterparts in public highways and railroads. Just as an animal or a tree matures naturally, so the individuals composing the state, if only they are left alone, will eliminate the evil and enhance the good.

Space does not permit an extensive criticism of Spencer's theory of government. In passing, however, it may be observed that the tendency of politics in the countries where evolutionary thought has been most exploited has been just the opposite of Spencer's theoretical claims. Huxley, who practically started with the same premises, came to collectivistic conclusions in the realm of practical politics. I think that in *Administrative Nihilism* his argument against Spencer is cogent, when he insists that the logical outcome of a naturalistic conception of man is the assumption by the state of more and more personal functions.³

*"But if the resemblances between the body physiological and the body politic are any indication, not only of what the latter is, and how it has become what it is, but of what it ought to be, and what it is tending to become, I cannot but think that the real force of the analogy is totally opposed to the negative view of State function.

"Suppose that, in accordance with this view, each muscle were to maintain that the nervous system had no right to interfere with its contraction, except to prevent it from hindering the contraction of another muscle; or each gland, that it had a right to secrete, so long as its secretion interfered with no other; suppose every separate cell

If it is conceded that a naturalistic determinism, by deposing the self from its high office, tends to produce a mechanistic society, the question still remains whether a deterministic conception in religion produces the same result. The term theological determinism may be used in two senses.

In the strict sense it implies that the Deity predestined from the beginning all things that come to pass, both good and evil. Mohammedanism and Augustinianism are very specific in this respect. Say the *Koran* and the *Traditions*, "The Prophet said, verily, the first thing which God created was the pen, and He said to it write. It said, what shall I write? He said, write down the divine decrees (quadar); and it wrote down all that was and all that will be to eternity. . . . He leads astray whom He will and guides whom He will. . . . Verily God most high has ordained five things on each of His servants from His creation: his appointed time, his actions, his dwelling place, his travels and his subsistence. . . . When God creates any servant for heaven, He causes him to go in the way of those destined for heaven, until he dies, after which He takes him to heaven. And when He creates any servant for the fire of hell, then He causes him to go in the way of those destined for hell until his death, after which He takes him to hell." So Omar Khayyam sums up the prose into poetry:

"The moving finger writes; and, having writ,
 Moves on; nor all your piety or wit
 Shall lure it back to cancel half a line,
 Nor all your tears wash out a word of it."

In this particular doctrine the *Westminster Confession of Faith* uses very similar terminology. In speaking of "God's eternal decrees" it states: "God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will freely and un-

left free to follow its own "interest" and *laissez faire* lord of all, what would become of the body physiological?

"The fact is that the sovereign power of the body thinks for the physiological organism, acts for it, and rules the individual components with a rod of iron. Even the blood-corpuscles can't hold a public meeting without being accused of 'Congestion'—and the brain, like other despots whom we have known, calls out at once for the use of sharp steel against them." *Methods and Results, Essays*, "Administrative Nihilism." p. 271.

changeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; . . . By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His glory, some men and angels are predestined unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to everlasting death. These angels and men, thus predestined and fore-ordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished."

In the broader sense theological determinism includes the conception of God in which it is held that He rules with an iron hand, directly or indirectly through appointed agents, all His subjects. The future programme seems less rigidly fixed than in the more logical determinism. The ideal of the Old Testament theocracy was such a conception. The pattern of the tabernacle as well as the law and the plans of battle came directly from God. The Roman Church ultimately is based on the same conception. God, the pope, and the priests control the destiny of each individual.

But in both the broad and narrow sense there is a common element. The self is not merged into the Infinite, as is the case in pantheism, but the standing or the destiny of the self at any moment is determined and is the product of agencies outside the self. In naturalism the agents are heredity and environment. In theological determinism there is added a third factor, namely, the personal agency of the Deity or his representative on earth. The more deterministic the religious conception is, the less significant becomes the self. The individual, like a small stone in a mosaic picture, is fitted into his destined place by the master artist and his contribution to the artistic effect of the whole comes from his passivity and not from his activity.

The most telling example of the relation between a deterministic theology and social institutions is furnished by the history of Mohammedanism. The study is exceptionally fruitful because the complex influences, which are so numerous in other similar theological views, are conspicuously absent. In the thirteen centuries of Moslem history its religious tenets have remained singularly intact. In predestinarianism is to be found both the strength and the weakness of the Moslem faith. No more indomitable soldiers ever took the field than the early followers of Mohammed. Their onward march seemed irresistible. The man at the battle front is as immune to death as

the non-combatant until the "appointed time." In the time of peace, however, this same assurance produces a different result. Inclination becomes the guide of life. Self-exertion is minimized because it avails nothing. Society becomes sterile and stagnant. Mohammedan civilization is strong evidence of the decadent influence of spiritual determinism. Its institutions and its individuals are hampered and mechanized by law, rule, and tradition.

The history of the Jewish nation and of Catholicism bear out the same truth that the more the individual is conceived as a necessary fixture in the economy of God and the church, the more legalistic, ritualistic, and paternalistic become the social institutions in the respective civilizations.

It is true that deterministic theology in protestant countries has often developed marked individualistic tendencies. Kuyper in his lectures on *Calvinism* points out very eloquently how the Calvinistic faith has been the champion of liberty and democracy in Holland, England and America. But no one seriously claims that such results are traceable to the teaching of predestination. The right of private judgment and the teaching that man is ultimately subject to no human authority have had the most pronounced political consequences. The keynote of the Reformation was not determinism but rather this: "God alone is Lord of the conscience; and hath left it free from the doctrine and commandments of men, which are in anything contrary to his word, or besides it in matters of faith or worship."

The spirit of the Renaissance quite apart from religion, as embodied in such men as Erasmus and Reuchlin, was also a great liberalizing agency. When it is, therefore, said that Calvinism produced certain results, it must be remembered that Calvinism is a comprehensive term. It developed in a complex age, which was characterized by many independent movements. The beneficent influence of Calvinism was produced not because of, but in spite of, its predestinarian doctrine. In due time it will be considered whether Calvinism leaves any room for self-initiation. In so far as it does minimize the efficiency of the self, it tends to treat the individual in the same manner as other deterministic systems. It is highly significant that Calvin's rule in Geneva developed a most rigorous paternalistic government.

It is perhaps anticipating to say that the writer conceives the self both as creature and creator. This means that there will always be need of law, form and ritual in our institutions. The keen insight of the statesman will be required to determine when the restrictions on the creature become a detriment to the creator. But no one can become a true guide in practical affairs who has not first settled the problem of the nature of the self. The fact that evolutionary naturalism and theological determinism, with its accent on total depravity and predestination, have deprived the self of significant independence, makes it of vital importance to examine the foundations on which these two systems rest.

III NATURALISM

WHAT IS NATURALISM?

Philosophy is engaged in a very ambitious undertaking, for it attempts to capture and exhibit things that evade the ordinary observer. The difficulty that confronts a missionary, who tries to disseminate a monotheistic conception of God among illiterate tribes, is not unlike the task of the philosopher who essays to give a clear exposition of his own convictions. Thought is always elusive and language a poor vehicle. In this respect the metaphysician makes confession with the poet of "Fancies that broke through language and escaped." The fact that words are an inadequate expression of the real spirit of any philosophic persuasion, makes it almost presumptuous for any one to attempt a valuation or summary of a system of thought to which he himself can not subscribe. It is ludicrous, not to say pathetic, for a speaker to boast that he will present both sides of a question impartially. No one can become thoroughly familiar with any vital question without coming to some personal conclusion. And when the conclusion is made, tacitly or avowedly, the multifarious data, which once seemed so flexible, become fixed; they receive a new color and meaning, now that they are definitely related to an espoused end. With these limitations clearly in mind we continue our study.

The child, perhaps, is the best exponent of naturalism. It finds itself in a world of time, space and objects, which impinge upon its sense organs and act and react upon each other. The vital problem of its existence is to learn the language, meaning and content of things in order to relate¹ itself to them in the most economic way. It takes things at their par value. From the geography of its body it passes to that of the home, the immediate vicinity, and finally to the larger and fuller world of nature. It makes a cosmos out of chaos, not by the

¹ The question of self and not-self, implied by the word 'relate,' does not enter the child consciousness. In this unreflective stage the cognitive function is not unlike that of the animal, i. e., accommodation.

introduction of a new principle of interpretation, but by passive obedience and by observation of things just as they exist. The knowledge of reality comes like the knowledge of a foreign tongue. The word, the sentence and the meaning are not changed because a new individual masters them. The attitude of the naturalistic thinker is not unlike that of the child. He finds himself *in mediis rebus*; multiplicity and heterogeneity prevail. Things must be related, unified and explained in order that life may be fruitful. He sets about his task in the most natural way.² From his childhood experience he has learned how to reduce the complex to the simple; how to explain phenomena that were once inexplicable; how to find significance in the insignificant. The results thus far have only been an earnest of the things to come. With logic and science as his trusted field-m Marshals the naturalistic warrior goes forth boldly seeking new conquests.

What are the conquests of naturalism? What are its conclusions? Most important is the claimed reduction of the qualitative to the quantitative, the world of appreciation to the world of description, the spiritual to the material. Science comes in the rôle of a great emancipator. The scalpel and the laboratory have freed us from the myth of freedom, religion and personality. "Belief in the so-called freedom of the will," says Dr. P. W. Van Peyma, "is a relic and an inheritance of an unscientific past; an age of belief in devils and witches, in magic and miracles; in divine interposition and special providence. But as knowledge widens we find that the range of possibilities is lost in necessity."³ Huxley is well qualified to speak for his school and therefore the following citation is significant:

"Any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit, that its progress has in all ages meant, and now more than ever means that extension of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity. . . . And as surely as every future grows out of the

² Whether the thinker begins as Pearson does in *Grammar of Science* with *sensation*, or with *bodies* as is the case with Ostwald in *Primer of Naturalism* the method is the same, namely, to start with that which is immediately given.

³ *The Why of the Will*, p. 41.

past and present so will the physiology of the future gradually extend the realm of matter and law until it is coextensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action. The consciousness of this great truth weighs like a nightmare upon many of the best minds of these days. The advancing tide of matter threatens to drown their souls; the tightening grasp of law impedes their freedom."⁴

Hume in a less serious vein graphically expresses the same convictions. "If we take in hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."⁵

The above quotations hardly represent the real temper and attitude of the naturalistic thinker of to-day. In most writers one finds a pathetic sense of loss and regret.⁶ They are aware that something valuable has vanished from their lives. It is not that they are enemies of religion, God, and spiritual values; but all these are found to be supernumeraries, and thus are naturally eliminated from the construction of reality. Laplace's reply to Napoleon's query when he presented his *Mecanique*

⁴ *Collected Essays*, Eversley Edition, Vol. I, p. 159.

⁵ *Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding*.

⁶ "It is therefore with the utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions here worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save the strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of society to give his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they may be worth. . . . I am not ashamed to confess that with this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its soul of loveliness; . . . I think, as think at times I must, of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,—at such times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence not being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or whether it be due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me at least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that for me, and for others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in those words of Hamilton,—Philosophy having become a meditation, not merely of death, but of annihilation, the precept *know thyself* has become transformed into the terrific oracle of Oedipus—'Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art:.' " Romanes, *A Candid Examination of Theism*, pp. 113, 114.

Celeste fairly represents the position of the scientist. "M. Laplace," said Napoleon, "they tell me you have written this large book on the system of the universe and have never mentioned its Creator." Laplace's answer was brief but to the point: "Sir I have no need of any such hypothesis."⁷ And the scientist is not without an answer if it is asked why he has no need of such an hypothesis; why spirit and consciousness are not permitted to remain as independent entities.

It is a safe principle in any investigation to begin with the known and the definite. At least provisionally, reality must be defined as the heaviest things in life; the things that can be grasped by the senses and can be manipulated by experimentation. But the observer soon finds that many "weighty" matters have no tangible form. They can not be subsumed under physical categories. Introspection intrudes into the scientist's sanctuary. Consciousness becomes a very tantalizing companion. The naturalist, however, has a very plausible explanation for all spiritual conceptions. Religion and morality serve a useful purpose, but they are prone to forget their humble origin. The bright tungsten light is many steps removed from, but it is nevertheless directly and quantitatively related to, the black and inert piece of coal.

The classification of material things is made possible because nature has a rationalistic structure. Everywhere there is *Einheit in Verschiedenheit*. If unity and uniformity did not exist logic would be but a name; nature could have no spokesman; language and mutual intercourse would be impossible. A world without uniformity would be like a body without a skeleton: there would be no coherence, no permanency and no articulate expression. The same uniformity that prevails in the construction of bodies also obtains in the action and reaction among them. A formulation of the way bodies behave is called a law of nature. Its validity depends on the insoluble nexus between cause and effect, between antecedent and consequent. All action or efficiency is quantitatively measurable. Reality must and can be explained in this descriptive terminology of science. If anything is not thus explicable it is designated, by virtue of that fact, as a pseudo-phenomenon. This principle of uniformity, which is so easily detected in the inorganic world, is then rigorously applied to the organic

⁷ W. W. Rouse Ball, *Short History of Mathematics*, p. 388.

world, the animal kingdom, and the conscious life of man. It is in this connection that the naturalist makes use of the facts furnished by evolution. With the aid of this information he claims to be able satisfactorily to explain the mental in terms of the physical and to reduce self-consciousness to terms which are amenable to scientific formulae.

The *amœba* is a unicellular protoplasmic animal. In the ordinary sense this organism has no digestive organs, no muscles, and no nervous system. However, the whole animal has the contractility of muscle and the irritability of nerve. The assimilation of food, the excretion of waste matter, and the reproductive process are carried on by no special organs but are performed by the organism as a whole. If any external stimulus, mechanical or chemical, impinges on the periphery, a specific amount of latent energy is set free and manifests itself in a definite reaction. This response is determined entirely by the strength and kind of irritant and the nature and state of the particular *amœba* affected. The higher forms of animal, and man in particular, are only a more complete organization of a large number of protoplasmic cells. The ova-sperm, which is a fusion of the ovum and spermatozoön, contains all the latent possibilities of the mature man. By a process of cleavage or segmentation the cells multiply very rapidly. As the division continues the structure and the function of the various parts become specialized. In due time the ova-sperm has differentiated itself into muscles, bones, nerves, and special senses.

Man's reaction to external stimulation is not unlike that of the *amœba*. In a pure reflex action there is no consciousness concomitant with the response. In the higher forms of response there is an invariable concomitant phenomenon (better designated epiphenomenon) called consciousness. But here also, as was the case with the less developed organism, the afferent impulse plus the nature of the nerve center, which releases the stored-up energy, account quantitatively for the strength of the efferent reaction. The most unique manifestation of consciousness in higher animals is volition. When conflicting impulses come to consciousness it is, of course, impossible to respond to both. In all such appeals there is consciously or unconsciously a preponderance of inclination in favor of one of the alternatives. A so-called decision of the will is merely the turning of the scales in the

direction of the greater weight. Consciousness may thus be considered either as nature's extreme example of the versatility of transformed energy, or the necessary concomitant of a certain peculiar configuration of living cells. As convexity implies concavity, so certain cell arrangements may imply conscious life.⁸

The application of biometric methods to biology and psychology have furnished support to the above contention. There is at least a vital conditioning if not a causal relation between the shape, structure and quality of the brain and nervous system and the moral, mental and spiritual condition of races and individuals. The different nervous constitution, and not any spiritual condition, distinguishes the phlegmatic German from the emotional Frenchman. Lombroso⁹ and his school undoubtedly made exaggerated claims in regard to the "criminal type," still a careful tabulation of the physiological features of men and women who find their way into penal institutions substantiates the claim that certain congenital physical characteristics convey moral and mental deficiencies. The determinacy of human action is also argued from the fact that the future acts of a group of individuals can be foretold with greater certainty, for example, than the meteorologist can forecast the weather. And whenever any sudden change occurs in the predicted results it is generally admitted that some external condition has changed, and the disturbance in turn has influenced the individuals.¹⁰ The strict dependence of the mental on the physical; the reduction of the immaterial and qualitative to the material and quantitative; the leveling of all phenomena to a common denominator of energy or matter in motion, are but the heralds of "the advancing tide of matter" whose onward progress strengthens "the tightening grasp of law." Nothing but a thoroughgoing determinism can result from the naturalistic interpretation of the world. Every

⁸ Cf. Prof. H. C. Warren's address, *The Mental and the Physical*, Psychological Review, March, 1914.

⁹ Lombroso in his *L'homo Delinquent* distinguishes the born criminal type from other men by the following stigmata:

1. Excessive asymmetry of the skull.
2. Small cranial capacity.
3. Abnormal features.
4. Slight growth of beard relative to hair on head.

¹⁰ Cf. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 310.

thought and act at any moment is determined by the state of the individual and his environmental conditions. But his state and environment at any time are the necessary products of the natural course of events. Just as the position of a grain of sand on the beach is the resultant of untold but definite physical antecedents, so each emotion, each thought, each page of history has had an equally fixed chain of quantitatively measurable antecedents. If naturalism is true then a free self-determining agent is a myth and a delusion.

CRITICISM

If the foregoing exposition is a fair presentation of the nature, method and purpose of naturalism, the way is opened for a critical examination. Does the scientific method alone, if at all, lead to reality? Is science justified in making statements concerning the "what" as contrasted with the "how"? Does not the naturalistic position ultimately rest on speculative thought and presuppositions which can never become elements of experience nor objects of experimentation, and thus depend for their substantiation on proof other than scientific? The following lines of thought, it seems to me, reveal the most vulnerable parts of the naturalistic armor. To say that these arguments *per se* are conclusive would be philosophic arrogance; but the claim that these observations, regarding the naturalistic position, militate against a coherent and consistent construction of the data furnished by the world as a whole, is but the outcome of an attempt genuinely to comprehend things in their totality. Apart from the domain where demonstrative evidence is procurable, no single argument or cluster of arguments is sufficient to disprove a system of thought. It is rather the cumulative effect of the main arguments, coupled with innumerable necessary implications, that is most potent in producing conviction.

A. SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLE OF EXTENSION

My first contention is that the so-called "scientific principle of extension" may lead to error whenever the conclusion does not permit of concrete verification.

Scientific reasoning proceeds in a straight line. The scientist reasons forward and backward on this line, always, however,

assuming the uniformity and continuity of nature. When he comes to the linear limits of observable data, he projects over the limit and assumes that the same processes which took place within the limits, where scientific data were observable, will take place, or have taken place, in the same manner outside those limits. For example the scientist measures temperature by the expansion or contraction of some substance. This process is observable within narrow limits, but the assumption is made that the same quantitative change takes place after verification is no longer possible. But it is quite conceivable and even probable that there may ensue a qualitative change in the process, or that the same numerical relation between temperature and volume no longer obtains. This actually happens in the case of water. Down to a certain degree water contracts as the temperature is lowered, but at a critical point the process is completely reversed and the water begins to expand.

This possibility of error is much enhanced when the principle of extension is applied to social, economic, historical, moral and religious phenomena, i. e. in the realm where self-consciousness becomes a potent factor. The "law of diminishing utility" is an illuminating example. "As the amount of any good increases, after a certain point the gratification that the added portions afford decreases."¹¹ The diminution of gratification continues until ultimately pleasure is changed to pain. In the study of social conditions it is found that as people collect in a locality, thus making coöperation possible, better sanitation, education and general welfare ensue. But when the size of the city passes a certain point, not only do increased advantages cease, but many additional evils become manifest.

In most of the cases cited above verification is possible, and the results are corrected by an appeal to facts.¹² But in the evolutionary process to which the naturalist appeals in his attempt to make the data of morality, religion and self-consciousness amenable to scientific formulae, no such empirical verification is possible. The *terminus a quo* is the moral,

¹¹ F. A. Fetter, *The Principles of Economics*, p. 22.

¹² Just as in logic an 'empirical division' is a corrected 'logical division.' The latter gives ideal groups and an appeal to experience must be made to eliminate the members of the division that do not obtain in the economy of nature.

religious and self-conscious man as we know him today; the *terminus ad quem* is the most primitive man. Between these two termini there is a clearly marked gradational development. Heredity, social instinct, and environment explain to a great extent the progress man has made in this period in the development of a monotheistic religion and a morality of oughtness. But in the words of T. H. Green: "The most primitive man they exhibit is already conscious of his own good as conditioned by that of others, already capable of recognizing an obligation."¹⁸ So it is also found that the most primitive man is self-conscious and has a religion, however you may define that term. Morality, religion and self-consciousness hopelessly remove the primitive man from the highest form of animal. The question is not how these human qualities have successively manifested themselves in history but rather this: How account for these entities at all? It is here that the scientist has access to that questionable personage called prehistoric man.

But now the scientist has departed from his sure foothold of "experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence." He is in a speculative realm where his compass and sextant are useless. He has pushed from the known to the unknown. When he again emerges on the known animal plane a great change has taken place. He still finds mentality in the animal, but self-consciousness, with its concomitant capacity to recognize an obligation and to worship, has been lost in the twilight zone that separates man from the animal. To continue the quotation from Green: "The theory of descent and evolution opens up a vista of possibilities beyond the facts, so far ascertained, of human history, and suggests an enquiry into the antecedents of the moralized man based on other data than the records which he has left of himself." Thus, when the scientist asserts that in the *amœba* there is potentially present a consciousness the same in quality as that in a religious and moral man, he must admit that this conclusion was arrived at after a long journey through the wilderness of speculative thought where the data of science—"matter of fact and existence"—were not observable and therefore where the usual scientific method was not the sole guiding principle.

¹⁸ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 8.

B. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

My second observation is that the basic assumptions of naturalism are hypothetical and arbitrary. The assumptions are these: Nature is a complex but self-contained system in which uniform laws prevail universally; in which all change—social, historical and economic included—is explicable as the transference of energy from one form or vehicle to another; in which the amount of energy is a constant quantity. In brief the scientist postulates the “uniformity of nature,” the “conservation of energy,” and the “inertia of matter.” He holds as absurd and inconceivable that an effect is produced by anything but by transferred antecedent motion; that the psychical effectively projects into the physical; that there is an entity determined by itself and not by ‘other.’ The following quotation advances a position which an unprejudiced student of phenomena must admit to be at least plausible. To the scientist the position seems incomprehensible.

“The course of the world” says Lotze, “may every moment have innumerable beginnings whose origin lies outside it, but can have none not necessarily contained within it. Where such beginnings are to be found we cannot beforehand say with certainty; but if experience convinces us that every event of external nature is at the same time an effect having its cause in preceding facts, it still remains possible that the cycle of inner mental life does not consist throughout of a rigid mechanism working necessarily, but that along with unlimited freedom of will it also possesses a limited power of unconditional commencement.”¹⁴

The psychologist also too often begins his investigations with rigorous deterministic presuppositions, which preclude *ab initio* independent significance for psychical phenomena. “Psychology,” writes Hoeffding, “must be deterministic, that is to say, it must start from the assumption that the causal law holds good even in the life of the will, just as the law is assumed to be valid for the remaining life and for material nature.”

I submit that such assumptions are arbitrary and unwarranted if justice is to be done to the facts, and if any regard is to be had for philosophical method. Ladd is fully justified when in criticism of the above passage he says: “Psychology

¹⁴ *Microcosmus*, Vol. I, p. 261.

has no right to such assumption; it must stick to the facts of consciousness, discuss and describe them just as they are, then, if it can, explain them, but it must not sophisticate them. Among these facts it finds the conscious and deliberate choice. Its appearance is not that of a fact in which the causal law holds good; it is rather that of a fact arising in the mysterious depth of the self-directing mind."¹⁵

What are the facts which the psychologist and the scientist find and which they try to force into the formulae of physics? There is, of course, first of all the great multiplicity of material phenomena: the falling stone, the receding tide, chemical affinities, geological strata—in brief, physical action and reaction. But it would be a mistake to assume that these manifestations constitute even the major part of knowledge and experience. There is on the other hand the amazing wealth of data and fact furnished by history. In the broad sense history is the articulated expression of consciousness. The conscious life of the billions, who have inhabited the globe, has found embodiment in social and religious institutions, in art, in literature and in philosophy. If all the facts of the physical sciences were enclosed in one book and all the facts of the social sciences in another, no one can deny but that the latter would be much more voluminous. It is not intimated that this statement proves or disproves anything, but it does bring out a fact, which the scientists only too often ignore, namely, that there is no preponderance of physical over social data.

If we approach these records of consciousness without any presuppositions there emerge some patent facts. Human history is non-repetitive; it is constituted of a vast number of unique individual acts. In as far as these acts are the expression of rational beings they assume a continuity and coherence; but the connection that binds them together is different from the bond that unites physical phenomena. Like M. Henri Bergson's conception of time, history is a qualitative multiplicity, a heterogeneity of elements that interpenetrate and commingle with one another.

There are no *a priori* reasons why these phenomena, so unlike physical facts, should conform to the same causal laws observable in the material world. The decision must be arbitrary which disqualifies half the eligible players before the

¹⁵ *Outlines of Descriptive Psychology*, p. 336.

game begins. To assume that the mental is amenable to the laws of physical science; to assume that consciousness is equal to $\frac{1}{2} m v^2$ is to prejudge the case. It can be said of the naturalist as Aristotle said of the Pythagoreans, that they are "forcing phenomena into accordance with certain reasonings and notions of their own." I confess that I cannot see the force of Prof. H. C. Warren's logic when he says: "The burden of proof rests on those who deny the regularity and determinacy of human volition and human reasoning."¹⁶ It is equally if not more imperative that he establish that reason does not make possible the regularity observable in nature.¹⁷

It must not be understood that fault has been found with the scientist because he begins his researches with definite presuppositions which at the present stage may still be unverified hypotheses. Every investigation must proceed in some such manner. The work and the instruments of science are teleological. Their object is to subjugate nature in such a way that it may become an object of knowledge and a benefit to mankind. To carry out this purpose recourse must be had to abstractions—space, time, energy, mass and motion. Most of these concepts are defined by the scientist in terms of each other. True, this does not shed any light on their real nature but for all scientific purposes such definition is adequate. As long as the scientist does not presume to write a metaphysic, and admits that he is only investigating a limited field of reality—"the world of description"¹⁸—he is making a legitimate use of his abstract conceptions. But when he quotes his axioms and then proceeds to assert that, in so far as "the world of appreciation" cannot be subsumed under these categories, it has no significance and reality, the naturalistic thinker makes an illegitimate use of his rubrics because he attempts to apply them to phenomena beyond the scientist's domain. It need hardly be reiterated that the above-mentioned axioms are neither self evident nor necessitated by the laws of thought. Even Mill declared that it was an unwarranted assertion to claim that the principle of causation as taught by science obtained in the whole universe.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 100

¹⁷ Cf. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, "The Spiritual Principle in Knowledge and Nature."

¹⁸ Cf. J. Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, Lecture XII, "The World of Description and the World of Appreciation."

Let us examine a little more carefully one of these axioms, as a typical case, in order to get a better conception of their tentative character. I select the principle of conservation of energy, because it is so strongly maintained that, if a free self determining entity were recognized in reality, the very warp and woof of the scientific fabric would be torn into shreds.

Conservation of energy is defined thus: "In a system of bodies neither acted upon by, nor acting upon, anything outside of itself, the total energy of the system remains invariable only changing from one form into another."¹⁹ The "system" may refer to a clock, the earth, the solar system or the universe. Reality consists of a fixed amount of energy captured and expressed in a "world formula" by science. If mind, which is not a "system of bodies," were so bound up with matter as to become an efficacious agent, the above principle would be invalidated; Shakespeare's plays could no longer be equated to $\frac{1}{2}mv^2$, for now the molecular motions of his brain have been supplemented by a spiritual efficiency. My contention is that no harm can accrue to the conception of the permanency and regularity of nature by leaving room in the scientific programme for a dynamic spiritual principle. There may well be an interpenetration of the spiritual and the physical. When once the spiritual has projected itself into the realm of the physical, where the law of cause and effect obtains, the supplied energy would conform to the laws of change and transference which exists in that particular physical system. When a meteor falls into the ocean the configuration of the whole earth is readjusted and the sum of the mass particles on the globe is increased by the intrusion of a stranger from another realm. But no law of physics or thermodynamics has thereby been vitiated. It must be remembered that there is a distinction between the assertion that there are constant mechanical equivalents between the various forms of energy, and the gratuitous assumption that the quantity of energy in the universe is finite and invariable. The physicist speaks of kinetic, potential, dissipated and latent energy. Of latent energy we know little or nothing; dissipated energy can never be reinstated as available power; potential energy, "capacity for capacity of work," is not mechanically of the same dimension as kinetic energy. But as yet no means have been devised by

¹⁹ Baldwin, *Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy*.

which these different forms of energy can be accurately calculated and therefore we cannot dogmatize about the amount and constancy of energy in the universe. Such a dogmatic statement would be as tenable as the contention that the quantity of water in a lake must be constant because the surface is always level. Or the attitude of the physicist might be likened to that of an imaginary economist who had never heard of production and consumption, but confined his entire attention to the study of the laws of exchange. With an entire disregard of the laws of production and consumption, supply and demand curves can be mathematically constructed.²⁰ "In the grander economics of nature the relations might be similar." The forces of the universe may continually be enhanced by agents which are not themselves part of the mechanistic system which we call nature. It may well be that reality is richer in content than a scientific formula or a logical concept.

While, therefore, the physicist may tell us much about the behavior of mass particles in the sphere of his observation and while he may formulate accurately the laws to which certain kinds of energy conform as they pass from one state to another, he can only speak in hypothetical terms when he essays to limit the bounds of reality by the declamation of a few assumed axioms.

C. EPISTEMOLOGY

In the third place I submit that, when due regard is given to epistemological considerations, it is found that naturalism presupposes—to use T. H. Green's phraseology—a spiritual principle in nature which is not a part or product of nature, in that sense of nature in which it is said to be an object of knowledge.

Thus far in our examination the existence, the nature, and the importance of the knower or sponsor of naturalism (or any other *ism*) has not been insisted upon. It has only been urged that, when the naturalistic scientist undertakes to give a comprehensive account of reality, his methods and assumptions are open to criticism and subject to modification. He is unwarranted so to construe the world that all facts must be reduced to matter or motion. It has also been indicated that no

²⁰ Illustrations by J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, p. 75.

harm need accrue to any of the necessary postulates of science if a *causa eminens* prevails in conjunction with a *causa formalis*.

An advance step now becomes imperative. The relation of subject to object, of knower to the thing known must be carefully surveyed. What are the necessary implications in the process of knowing nature in the scientific sense as a connected system of uniform laws? Is the subject knowing any part of, or the sum of any parts of, the concatenated matters of fact and experience which are the data of science? Is there any validity in Kant's statement? "Macht zwar der Verstand die Natur, aber er schafft sie nicht." When Huxley exclaims: "Fact I know and law I know" does he not imply a conditioning relation between the "I" and the "fact" and "law"?

In urging these epistemological questions, I am fully aware of the disrepute into which epistemology has come in some philosophical circles. Prof. W. T. Marvin writes in all seriousness: "Those who deny that the theory of knowledge is fundamental believe that the idealists are here guilty of a grievous logical treason whereby, through a *coup d'état* a perfectly legitimate special science has been raised by them from the humble rank of a private citizen in the world of science to be the infallible and supreme autocrat and judge over all the other sciences."²¹

But it is of great importance to note that epistemology is not a "special science" at all, even though it claims to be scientific in its method. A particular science investigates and systematizes as far as possible all the facts contained within a specific sphere. Philosophy (including epistemology as one of its branches), assimilating the knowledge furnished by the special sciences, attempts to gain a new insight and present a more consistent conception of the nature of reality. It is true that a man can see without understanding the mechanism of the eye; it is true that a man can know without understanding

²¹ *A First Book in Metaphysics*, p. 204. Ever since the publication of Locke's *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* there has been a tendency to permit epistemology to supplant metaphysics. This tendency, however, has been over emphasized by the Neo-Realists in their vituperative attacks against epistemology. Vide W. T. Marvin, "The Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epistemology," in the *New Realism*.

the process of knowing; but it is also true that the mechanism of the eye fixes the limits of vision and that the nature of the cognitive function determines to a large extent the measure and nature of knowledge. Epistemology is fundamental to all the sciences not because of the usurpation of power, but because all the facts of the sciences are obtained and systematized by the use of the cognitive faculty. The center of the circle is more fundamental than any radius because all the radii presuppose and must pass through the center. Criticism is not like an infallible autocrat, ruling the philosophic and scientific domain with a high hand; it is better likened to a light house, which from its natural point of vantage throws its searching light far out into the distant future, beckoning onward in the right direction both science and philosophy.

This brief exposition of the grounds on which a theory of knowledge is justified is indispensable not only because the naturalists usually ignore these considerations altogether, but also because the epistemological argument is the most distinctive, and gives the first assurance that reality contains a genuine spiritual element.

The old proverb, "As iron sharpeneth iron so the countenance of man his fellow," nowhere finds better embodiment than in philosophic controversies. Here, unlike other relations in life, a man's dearest foe is his best friend. The stronger the position of the opponent, the better can be displayed the strength and the mettle of the antagonist. If there had been no Hume there might have been no Kant; if there were no naturalism there would be no clearly defined spiritualism.

Hume divided all the objects of human reason or inquiry into "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact." The former constitute intuitive or demonstrative affirmations—the necessary logical implications of thought which are formulated in mathematics and geometry. The latter deal with the so-called phenomena of nature. Here we deal only in probabilities. Hume clearly saw that the fundamental conception in nature, as a connected series of events, is causality. Contiguity, succession and necessary connection are the three essential elements in causation. The first two are explicable from the data furnished by observation and sense impressions. In his searching analysis Hume points out that neither the cause nor the effect can disclose the nexus that binds phenomena to-



gether. "No connections," says Hume, "among distinct existences are ever discovered by human understanding." To explain then the "necessary connections" among phenomena Hume had recourse to the psychology of association, in which custom and experience account for the delusion of causality.

And yet it is interesting to observe that Hume was dissatisfied with the skepticism to which his position naturally led. He admitted that the many sense perceptions were in some way unified in one consciousness; but this principle of unity had no significance for him. It was Kant who developed Hume's vague feeling for a permanent unifying principle into the "originally synthetic unity of apperception." How close Hume came to Kant's position in this respect is significantly pointed out by Ward.²² In his *Treatise* Hume says: "The human mind is but a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence and modify each other." But in the appendix to the later editions of the *Treatise* he confesses: "But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought and consciousness."

It is here that we begin to find the limitations of naturalism and its necessary termination in spiritualism. If there were no unifying principle in consciousness independent of "successive perceptions", there could be no 'I' and if there were no 'I', there could be no 'facts' and 'law,' for these only become common property when related to a consciousness. There can be no naturalism or science which does not presuppose as instrument of research and formulation an element which is not naturalistic in the narrow sense. In order that science may become serviceable, that thought may become knowledge, and knowledge power, there must be permanence and certitude. But if knowledge, on the one hand, is merely "matters of fact" i. e. successive sense perceptions, it has no coherence and universality; and if, on the other hand, it consists of "relations of ideas," it has no necessary reality.

Thus it is realized that, since consciousness is at the same time equally present to a series of events, it cannot itself be a part or product of such a series. In other words, a knowledge

²² *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, p. 228.

of nature cannot be a part of nature. Triton, emerging from the sea and apprehending the wide expanse of water with one sweep of the eye, cannot be any part or product of the element which is native to him and which he has the power to survey. However far the scientist moves from his starting point, he is constrained to acknowledge the centrality of the knowing and thinking self; to find his *ποῦ στῶ* in Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum*. It is a highly significant fact that a scientific thinker as naturalistic as Huxley should admit, "that our one certainty is the existence of the mental world."

The genesis of knowledge is thus to be found in consciousness. It is this spiritual element that construes nature and gives meaning to it. It is that organizing and form-giving element in knowledge which is the basis of Kantian thought.

The conceptualizing process illustrates on a small scale the primacy and the nature of this spiritual element, whether embodied in a finite self or in the Absolute. Through the avenues of the senses there come to the mind various separate sensations, which consciousness unifies into a concept. Multiplicity is reduced to simplicity. The one emerges from the many. This unifying principle in conscious experience finds its ideal counterpart in the unity of nature. The function of science is to conceptualize the universe. The pattern for this task is found in the nature of the scientist's self-conscious life.

Both logically and empirically the spiritual precedes the material. The latter can only be interpreted in the light of the former. Consciousness can include nature but nature cannot include consciousness. The fallacious conclusions of naturalism are traceable to the fact that this process is reversed. *Der Verstand macht die Natur* and not *die Natur den Verstand*.

IV THEOLOGICAL DETERMINISM

If any one doubts the all pervasive influence of fatalism as it emerges from a naturalistic world-view, let him read the literature of the day, e.g. Zola's, *The Human Beast*, Couperus' *Destiny*, Ibsen's *Ghosts*. Here is found in new disguise the inexorable *Moîpa* of the ancients and the inscrutable *Kismet* of the Oriental, which irresistibly grinds out the minutest details of human life and seals the destiny of all. Each man plays his part, good or bad, in conformity to the deposit that has come to him from untold ancestors, and in response to the particular environment in which he happens to exist. There is no real merit or demerit. Goodness and badness, heroism and cowardice, crime and virtue are essentially meaningless distinctions. A cynical skepticism and a petrifying resignation sap the life and energy of the individual and social institutions. External props are invented to sustain the tottering life.

Of course, if such a philosophy were true, it would be incumbent humbly to submit to our tragic fate. In our investigation thus far, however, we have found reasons for the conviction that there is in man a principle of personality which is beyond the reach of scientific mechanism. There is encouragement for the belief that in the realm of selfhood there is room for freedom, morality and real worth. If such an individual self is the unit of our social, religious and political institutions, then our attitude toward practical problems must adjust itself accordingly. If each unit has creative power and can actually effect change, and if the consciousness of this fact becomes universal, a great dynamic force will at once disclose itself. The emancipation from undue bondage to heredity and environment will be a great transforming power.

But when the thinker has found his way through mechanism into the realm of spiritual reality, he is by no means assured a safe retreat from the stern mastery of necessity. Perchance he turns to idealistic philosophy or theology and to his amazement finds himself in the clutches of a new mechanism, euphemistically styled soft determinism.

It is a significant fact that practically all reformed theology, with the single exception of Arminianism, is strictly deterministic. The necessarianism of St. Augustine, John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards maintains its integrity in the official creed of most denominations. The poet has well portrayed their position:

"With earth's first clay they did the last man knead,
And there of the last harvest sowed the seed,
And the first morning of creation wrote
What the last dawn of reckoning shall read."

To be sure the doctrine of predestination has retreated into seclusion in many quarters, yet it still remains the theoretical basis of much religious teaching. The inimical result in the first instance does not issue from the actual influences of a spiritual deterministic world-view but from the fact that, in an age of naturalistic fatalism, the church has no positive counter-acting influence, which can break the bonds of necessity and restore man to his legitimate sphere of self-initiation. Little comfort can be obtained by postulating a supreme Deity, who has constructed the loom and devised the pattern of the net and decreed the weaving of every loop. To the many, who are destined ever to be misfits in the cosmic process, a theistic determinism is sheer mockery. "The chain of Fate" says Dr. Henry van Dyke, "is not made less heavy by fastening the end of it to the distant throne of an omnipotent and impassive Creator. If our false sense of freedom comes from such a Being, who is Himself free, it is all the more a cruel and bitter enigma. If moral responsibility has been imposed upon us by the same hand which has bound us to an inalterable destiny, it is all the more a crushing and miserable fraud. To baptize fatalism with a Christian name does not change its nature. To hold fast to the metaphysical conception of God while accepting heredity and environment as His only and infallible prophets is simply to add a new ethical horror to the dismal delusion of life, and to fall back into the pessimism of Omar Khayyam."¹

The above quotation makes the challenge that there is little to choose between a theistic and a naturalistic determinism. The one may be blind and the other intelligent, but my help-

¹ *The Gospel for an Age of Doubt*, pp. 216, 217.

lessness in both is the same, and both are equally inscrutable to me. The one may have a purposed end in view, but the good is realized by a tremendous waste of human souls.

The inadequacy of atomistic mechanism and theistic finalism, because of an underlying similarity, has been brought out very forcibly by a modern thinker who approaches the problem from a different point of view. His criticism of the two positions is significant because it confirms the opinion that a theology which is itself deterministic can never successfully combat the dispiriting influence of naturalism, which denies to man the power of self-control and the power effectively to change his condition. In working out a philosophy, culminating in a free self, M. Henri Bergson begins his construction with a chapter on mechanism and teleology. He points out that both positions, as now understood, are equally disastrous. If we substitute "theological determinism" for "radical finalism" his conclusion sheds light on our present problem.

"Radical mechanism implies a metaphysic in which the totality of the real is postulated complete in eternity, and in which the apparent duration of things expresses merely the infirmity of a mind that cannot know everything at once. But duration is something very different from this for our consciousness, that is to say for that which is most indispensable in our experience. We perceive duration as a stream against which we cannot go. It is the foundation of our being, and, as we feel, the very substance of the world in which we live. "But radical finalism is quite as unacceptable and for the same reason. The doctrine of teleology, in its extreme form, as we find it in Leibnitz for example, implies that things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged. But if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is useless again. As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that *all is given*. Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism. It springs from the same postulate. It substitutes the attraction of the future for the impulsion of the past."²

CALVINISM AND FATALISM

Thus far it has been more or less tacitly assumed that theological determinism is in the last analysis fatalism and equally

² *Creative Evolution*, translation by A. Mitchell, p. 39.

subversive of morality and real endeavor. However, it is well known that predestinarians truculently repudiate the idea of fatalism. Their position implies certainty but not necessity. Not to make this distinction is ignorantly to put Hobbes and Edwards under the same rubric; to establish a kinship between Calvinism and Islamism. That there is some difference between the two *isms* no one ventures to deny, but just what this distinction is, and what relation this distinction has to responsibility, freedom and other germane subjects, is a most important question. The following comparison brings out clearly the claimed relation between fatalism or *hard determinism*, and Calvinism or *soft determinism*.

The points in which they agree:

1. Whatever comes to pass God has foreordained.
2. What God has foreordained is certain and necessary.
3. The ultimate grounds of the decrees are in God and never in the objects of the decrees.

The points in which they differ:

1. Relation of God to evil:
 - A. In the fatalistic conception God's relation to evil is the same as to good, i. e. God is the *efficient* cause of both.
 - B. In the Calvinistic conception God is the *efficient* cause of good, but has only a *permissive* relation to evil.
2. Method of carrying out decrees:
 - A. In the Calvinistic conception God carries out His decrees in reference to the powers and nature of the object of the decree. If an individual is to be saved God makes him willing to be saved. If he is to be lost God hardens his heart so that he is not willing to be saved. The decrees are carried out on the basis of character and justice.
 - B. In the fatalistic conception God carries out His decrees without reference to the powers and nature of the object of the decree. The methods are arbitrary, and are not based on character or justice. God acts on the individual without first making him assent to the result which is to be produced.

The essential difference between the two positions is the character they attribute to the Deity. This amounts to saying

that the Deity reveals his character by his purpose and by the method he selects to bring his plans to fruition.

The crux of the situation is found in the nature of man's rôle in the rendition of God's programme. The fatalist knows only determination by 'other'. He makes an abrupt diremption between himself and the causes which determine his action. "His outward circumstances and inward acts are all equally determined by an inexorable law or influence residing out of himself."³ As contrasted with this procedure, the Calvinist affirms a *self*-determination. The self that chooses may be determined by 'other' but the present choice is always determined by 'self'. The remote antecedents of all actions coalesce in God, but the immediate determinants of any particular choice are the complex constituents of the whole self. There is still, at least remotely, determination by 'other' but there is also acquiescent determination by 'self'.

Christian self-determinism displays here a keen psychological analysis. Motivation is indisputably the universal law of choice.⁴ The following are its characteristics: (1) All motivation is *immanent*. Before anything can become operative in moving the will it must first assume the nature of internal energy. It must become indigenous to the mental life of a self-conscious individual. (2) All choice displays a *selective* character. The self functioning in volition projects itself in one direction in preference to another. The one is left, the other is taken. "And selection of alternatives involves a two-sided process, conscious annulment of ends as well as conscious self-commitment to the end that is chosen." (3) Every normal conative process has the power of *arrest*. Through the faculty of attention the fragments of the scattered self can be collected before the self moves from one state to another.

An examination of consciousness, when volition takes place, substantiates this analysis. The testimony for free agency seems universal, and, therefore, the self-determining agent is morally and legally responsible for his acts. In this sense it is claimed self-determinism provides the kind of freedom that is required as an ethical postulate. In this respect Calvinism is a distinct advance on the Islamic or fatalistic conception of the

³ Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, p. 280.

⁴ Cf. A. T. Ormond, *Freedom and Psycho-Genesis*, "Princeton Contributions to Psychology," Vol. I, p. 31.

self. But the exact nature of the freedom attained by this advance must be examined.

"It may be demonstrated," says Prof. A. T. Ormond, "that the present choice is self-determined, and at the same time the self that chooses may be predetermined by its antecedents. We may thus escape fatalism and still find ourselves in the clutches of necessity".⁵ The vital question is whether this necessity is sufficiently attenuated to change its real character by removing it one step, grounding it in God, and then calling it certainty. An end obtained by the compulsion of a self-conscious Deity is on that account a no less binding necessity than the result made necessary by the compulsion of any other force. "A man is free," writes Hodge, "so long as his volitions are the conscious expression of his own mind; or so long as his activity is determined and controlled by his reason and feelings."⁶ But, whence came his mind, his individuality, his character, his whole self, which at any moment makes a choice? Clearly these manifestations are traceable to heredity and environment. This fact the naturalistic thinker points out with great avidity. If you adhere to a theistic position, you widen the meaning of the two terms so as to admit an efficacious spiritual heredity and spiritual environment. God controls the factors and thus obtains any desired result.

At this point, however, the problem transcends psychology, for the individual has no consciousness of the actual nature and origin of his mental stock. God, who determines and foreordains a man's original character as well as his environment, is able, without any apparent intrusion into the realm of selfhood, to make necessary, that is to predestine, every choice and every act of the individual. In this way it is claimed that human freedom and predestination are reconciled. God's sovereignty is maintained without taxing out of existence freedom and responsibility. The individual agent, on the one hand, has the consciousness and conviction of sin, freedom and responsibility; the Deity, on the other, from eternity has foreordained, made necessary and certain all things, good and bad, that disclose themselves in the current of moving time.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. II. p. 288.

THEOLOGICAL SELF-DETERMINISM

What pragmatic and metaphysical significance has this "consciousness and conviction of freedom" which obtains in the theologian's self-determined agent? In the narrow sense it has a unique pragmatic value. Granted the fact of self-determinism, the foundation is ready for the construction of many practical institutions, even though it may afford no foundation at all for the construction of a *Weltanschauung*. Viewed from this limited standpoint I can, at least partially, agree with Rashdall's statements: "An act inspired by such and such a character is good, no matter what be the historical explanation of the genesis of such a character." "If it be true that the value of good character and conduct is not really affected by the question of its genesis, it is impossible that, except under the influence of intellectual confusion, any doctrine as to that genesis could destroy or weaken any reason for moral effort which I can possibly give to myself or urge upon another. For purely ethical purposes we need not look beyond the immediate cause of the acts."⁸ The real implication and meaning of Rashdall's attempt to separate ethics and moral conduct from their genetic or ultimate ground is very candidly betrayed by Abbé Ferdinand Galiani when he says: "The conviction of freedom is not the same thing as freedom but it produces absolutely the same thing in morals. The conviction of freedom is all that is wanted to establish a conscience, remorse, justice, rewards, and punishments; it answers every purpose."⁸

Granted that this statement were true, such a pseudo-freedom could never permanently satisfy the conscientious thinker who demands consistency between thinking and living, and coherency in his conception of reality as a whole. It is not the "influence of intellectual confusion" but rather the influence of intellectual clarification that demands an ultimately genetic or metaphysical grounding for "purely ethical purposes," moral effort, and character. You may call a character good or bad or designate an act vicious or virtuous without raising the question regarding the genesis of the character or the act; but the mere attribution of a moral quality to an act or charac-

⁸ *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, pp. 330, 331, 340.

⁸ Quoted by Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 322.

ter can never become a real basis for Christian ethics. Such an ethics always has, and I may venture to say must have, an *ought* in its system. But if "all is given" and the individual, though self-determined, is but a resultant of the Deity's own determination for him, it is a ludicrous, not to say a pathetic figure of speech, to insist that the individual *ought* to change his course or to conform to some standard, for at any and every moment in his career he is precisely what his remote antecedents have made him. If God absolutely fixes and fore-ordains before my birth every influence that will play on my life so as to produce certain good or bad predestined acts; if, therefore, I have no inherent power to effect a change in my condition or to alter circumstances, my metaphysical status is not changed because I am ignorant of the genetic factors which have produced me, and because I am deluded into construing my so-called self-determination as real freedom.

I can hypnotize my friend and suggest to him that at a certain hour on the next day he will perform a specific act, e. g. remove a calendar from the wall. At the appointed time my friend, unconscious of the mandate given to him the day before, in a very natural manner removes the calendar. The act was not unmotivated. It found its place in a legitimate way in the normal current of his self-conscious life. For all practical purposes the act was a self-determined expression of the agent, but the constraining, even though unconscious, necessity robbed the self-determination of all significant freedom. If in a similar way an agent could be compelled to commit a crime, no one would venture to assert that the act had any moral quality. And the hypnotist's defense would not be strengthened in the least by the euphemistic statement that he merely *permitted* the agent to commit the crime and that he was not himself the *efficient* cause of the crime.

If the Deity, however wise and good, with hands shielded by secondary causes, thus supplies and determines every antecedent that can become an efficient factor in life and character, then the self does not ultimately retain any more important rôle nor does it possess any more real freedom than it would possess under a strictly fatalistic régime. The conclusion seems inevitable. If things are necessarily determined, as to their origin and outcome, even before the agent emerges on the scene of action, stern necessity is not mollified by threshing

data through a self-conscious machine even though it puts its stamp of approval on every grain.

Let me summarize briefly. Our moral consciousness demands freedom, finds it, asserts it, and lives by it. We assume responsibility for our conduct. Penology is based on this assumption. Evil is hard to bear but it is not enigmatical to the individual in his own domain. The self charges both the good and the bad to its own account. If the testimony of consciousness is true, neither in theory nor in practice are we fatalists.

But the theologian and the metaphysician must take a more comprehensive view than that afforded by the individual, who is conscious of his self-determination and therefore of his freedom. The 'many' are inconceivable without some underlying unity. Theism has established God as the ultimate ground of things. But God to be God must possess attributes infinite in their quality. To be supreme and not merely *primus inter pares* He must be the actual and efficient agent of all that comes to pass. The unrolling of events from the scroll of time is but the manifestation of His eternal decrees. All must be predestined from the beginning else the Absolute could be taken by surprise as history evolved. He would not be omniscient and omnipotent if He did not foreordain and foreknow all things.

Here, however, the metaphysical conception of God trenches on the territory which in the beginning of our investigation was reserved for the plurality of finite selves. In such a fixed and "block universe," as James calls it, there is no elbow room for a self-initiating and free agent. This is a problem as old as philosophy itself. Can the absolutely determined plans of God so filter through the human soul that the emerging result, if good, enhances the real moral worth of the individual, or if bad, bespeaks moral delinquency and blame? I confess, that the process seems logically hopeless. The kind of self-determination, or free agency, that such a process permits, I have tried to point out, retains no essentially significant freedom. Pragmatically it is better than fatalism, metaphysically it is worse. Again if God has determined all, and man has no real creative ability, God is ultimately chargeable with sin. To say that He merely *permits* sin is a meaningless evasion, since the agent, in whom the sin is permitted, is the determined product of the Permitter.

There seems to be a hopeless conflict between the free 'many'

and the omnipotent 'One', and this has always been recognized. In theology there are on the one side Pelagius, Arminius and Wesley; on the other Augustine, Calvin and Edwards. The former begin with man and his freedom and find a God who does not conflict with this conception. The latter begin with a sovereign God and conclude with a man shorn of all real power and freedom. Is there a *via media* between the two apparently conflicting positions? I believe that God and free creative selves are not contradictory terms. To vindicate this is the purpose of the following discussion.

V THE NATURE OF THE SELF¹

The ultimate nature of the self opens a realm where the unwary fall into many pitfalls. In a short sketch one can merely present the salient features of a conclusion whose roots are deeply embedded in metaphysics. For our immediate purpose, therefore, many things may be taken for granted. In the criticism of naturalism the primacy of a spiritual principle in reality was vindicated. In the examination of theological determinism we accepted a plurality of selves and the unifying supreme Intelligence that is implied by these finite agents. There are finite personalities and there is an infinite Personality. We admitted the validity of the psychological analysis and other evidence adduced to establish a self-determined agent i. e. one in whom there is some ultimacy; but we rejected that kind of blind self-determination, styled theological, in which the acts of the agent are swallowed up by the predestinating Deity. What then are the features of a free self-determination which is significant and at the same time does not dethrone the Infinite?

Man in his essence is an unfinished piece of reality. He is the creation² of God—made in his image—but very unlike his other creations. *Things* are the phenomena of life; they are the transmitters of forces; they are the bearers of transeunt causality; they integrate and disintegrate without essential loss or gain: *selves*, on the other hand, both are and partly produce phenomena of life; they are real centers of force; in them inheres immanent causality; by their coöperation they enhance the spiritual efficiency of the world.³

¹ Cf. James, *Psychology*, Chapter IX, "The Stream of Thought"; Chapter X, "The Consciousness of Self." J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*. H. Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, Translation by F. L. Pogson, W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, Chapter XVII, "The Knowledge of other Minds than Our Own."

² Cf. J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, Supplementary Notes, "Dr. Howison on Creation," p. 455.

³ In this mutual labor Wundt finds the fundamental law of spiritual life, i. e. "The increase of spiritual energy" as contrasted with the

"Our human life" says Professor W. E. Hocking, "is only an apprenticeship in creativity." The creative power is a gift from God and distinguishes man from other animals. The animal with formative instincts uses natural organized instruments to remake his environment; man with creative intelligence uses self-made instruments to bring into being a new environment.⁴ This faculty in man, however, is limited in many ways. God creates the original stuff and gives it form; man can exercise his powers only on ready-made material. Again, man is begirt with the more or less fixed conditions of heredity and environment. But within this realm there is afforded to him a wide range of creative freedom. If properly understood, the mechanism with which the self seems beleaguered becomes the "handmaid of teleology" and furthers the immanent end. "Heredity," says Prof. A. T. Ormond, "conserves the end by preserving and transmitting the gains of individual experience, while the environing forces supply the necessary stimuli of development. . . . But free self determination is the end which all this hard and forbidding-looking mechanism has had at heart and has been realizing from the beginning."⁵

James, in his psychological analysis of the self, points out how a creative selection operates in every function of the mental process.⁶ As far as perception is a voluntary activity the self accentuates or subordinates sensations; it displays preference or dislike to the multifarious data that come into consciousness. The same directive power is exercised in reasoning. Rationality is expressed by disintegrating the "totality of phenomena reasoned about." The selected and significant parts are then synthetized so as to substantiate the desired conclusion. It is, therefore, not at all inappropriate if one should speak of the freedom of perception and the freedom of the reason.

It is, however, in the realm of aesthetics and ethics that man's creative powers come to real fruition. The good and the

fixed quantum of physical energy. Cf. *System der Philosophie*, "Wachsthum der geistigen Energie."

⁴ Cf. H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 147, ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁶ So also Baldwin. Cf. *Development and Evolution*, "Selective Thinking." p. 238.

beautiful are very closely related. "Every decision is a work of art." If the function of art is the revelation of reality, then, it matters little whether the real is disclosed in a *beautiful* character or a *good* painting. No violence is done if the adjectives are interchanged, for the good character and the beautiful painting are both the product of a creative self. Each personality stands in a unique relation to the rest of reality and, therefore, has a point of view and a conception that is only obtainable from that particular angle.

Every social and political institution is a work of art to which each member has contributed his distinctive share. Every ballot is a stroke of the brush. Every reformer is an art critic. The purpose of government is so to individualize each civic artist that, unhampered, he may socialize his personality. The fault in collectivism, and in socialism in particular, is that they try to socialize man at the expense of his individuality. That man is a political animal is a truth as old as Aristotle, but the Greek philosopher also taught that he is more than a mere member of an organization. The sum of a man is not the added result of his social and trade relations. He is also a super-social animal. The conception that each self is a creative being, an unfinished piece of reality, makes this fact plain. The finishing of such realities is greatly aided by organized society and, therefore, such society is indispensable. But no institution or collection of institutions can complete this finishing process. Free play must be given the individual to perform the task by himself. Society builds the foundation, the individual must rear the super-structure.

We decry the fact of machine-made men. Much can be done to better external conditions, but the essential thing is to teach man his innate power to rise superior to his inherited environment. What the individual is depends on society, and what society is depends on the individual. This is paradoxical but true. Society can never rise higher than its source, i. e. its members, but the individual may continue to make attainment after his social relations have made their last contribution. Ultimately each man must work out his own salvation. When his external relations are exhausted or when they thwart his purpose, there still remains the "intensive cultivation" of his moral domain. Man has a relation to God as well as to his

fellows. After much convincing evidence Dr. Hazard, in speaking of this realm of man's activity, concludes:

"We may more confidently than before deduce the conclusion, that the mind in the sphere of its own moral nature, applying an infallible knowledge which it possesses to material purely its own, may conceive an ideal moral creation and then realize this ideal in an actual creation by and in its own act of will; and hence, when willing in the sphere of his own moral nature, man is not only a creative first cause, but a *supreme* creative first cause; and, as his moral nature can be affected only by his own act of will, and no other power can will, or produce his own act of will, he is also, in the sphere of his moral nature, a *sole* creative first cause, though still a finite cause. Other intelligences may aid him by imparting knowledge; may by word of action instruct him in the architecture; but the application of his knowledge, the actual building, must be by himself alone."⁷

There is much unanimity among thinkers in their treatment of man's self-conscious life. The self has two "discriminated aspects." It is at once the knower and the known. It is both subject and object. It has the power to hold itself at arms length, as it were, in order that the self-examination may proceed. This ability of self-objectification is another distinguishing mark of the human animal. It is perhaps the unique *cachet* of personality.

The fact of this duplexity in the self is more important than its terminology. The Germans distinguish between the 'empirical self' and the 'pure ego'. James brings out the same idea in his treatment of the 'I' and the 'me'. More recently M. Henri Bergson, in making a new analysis of duration, has broken new ground in this field.⁸ Time is a qualitative multiplicity, an absolute heterogeneity of elements which interpenetrate one another. He distinguishes between the real self in pure duration and the external projection of this self in

⁷ *Man a Creative First Cause*, p 89. *Vide also Freedom of Mind in Willing.*

⁸ J. Ward claims to have anticipated by three years Bergson's conception that "there is an element in our concrete time-perception which has no place in our abstract conception of time." *Cf. The Realm of Ends*, note, page 306. *Vide also Ency. Brit. "Psychology"* 11th Ed., p 577.

spatial relations. Since there is no mutual externality in the moments of pure duration, there can be no antecedent and consequent, no cause and effect relations in the activity of the 'timal' self. Because of the misconception of duration, and thus also of the self, the associationist psychologists have fallen into error. If it is once understood that psychic intensity is never magnitude, all talk of the strongest motive determining the will is meaningless.

In this non-spatial self freedom inheres. It is not by a discursive process but by intuitive insight and penetrating introspection that the essence of reality is found. How then define freedom? "It is the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs." But what is this *relation*? It is indefinable just because we *are* free. We can only analyze and define magnitudes i. e. things that have mutual externalities and that have their position in a homogeneous space. Freedom is a process and if we insist on a definition we persist in making "a process into a thing and duration into extensity." Freedom cannot be defined without spatializing duration and, therefore, every attempt at definition unwittingly leads to determinism.

It is a fair question whether this analysis has any significant meaning for freedom. Is this indefinable and intuitive freedom any more satisfactory than Kant's freedom, which is so safely tucked away in the inaccessible noumenal realm? There is this advantage. M. Bergson's position, based on his own theory of knowledge, shows that, while the fact of freedom is not amenable to the same formulation and demonstration as a scientific fact, nevertheless its certainty and reality, verified by immediate consciousness, is unimpeachable. His whole argument substantiates, what is generally admitted, that the only infallible proof of freedom is the testimony of self-consciousness. The validity of this conviction is vindicated not so much by positive evidence as through a negative process which undermines a vicious and fallacious determinism. By showing how duration, intensity, and voluntry determination—purely psychic moments—have been misinterpreted by reason of the intrusion of spatial prejudice, M. Bergson has made the argument against a destructive determinism and, therefore, in favor of creative freedom well nigh conclusive.

While, therefore, the fundamental self is the bearer of reality and freedom, it remains barren as long as it abides alone. In

order to realize itself and to become fruitful it must be objectified in space; it must be thrown out into the current of social life. In other words it must assume the common symbols of extensity. The thought must be put in words; the burning conviction into vital oratory. The vision of beauty is restless until it finds embodiment in some concrete form; the spiritual impulse must manifest itself in worship and deeds of kindness. Here again is found the meaning in the economy of mechanism. The certainty and solidity, guaranteed by the causal nexus, afford public permanency and continuity to the ever changing self as it accumulates the living moments of concrete duration. The external world is the common denominator of selves. The laws of nature are the rules governing this great forum. If the rules were not strict, the game would not be worth while. It is true that this "hard and forbidding-looking mechanism" is the friend and not the foe of freedom.

In this well-defined competitive forum, where the activities of life take place, man is more at home than in the inner sanctum from whence the real issues of life flow. From the beginning of life the empirical self is our habitation. It is more exhilarating to live on the periphery than at the center; for there the movement is rapid and the scenery panoramic.

It is a well attested principle in jurisprudence that society develops from "status to contract." The family, the caste, the tribe or the government rigorously determines the exact scope and nature of the social and personal activities of the primitive man. As the race makes progress the individual is gradually freed from the bonds of condition and circumstance. By contract he is permitted to make his own status. So also in the wake of civilization there is observed a transformation in the *Kultur Geschichte* of nations. Pseudo-science, superstition, and religion have been clarified and vitalized by the rectifying power of reason. Society, i. e. the mass of its members, has been emancipated from the slavery of external determinants.

This philogenetic process has its ontogenetic counterpart. The child, the primitive father of the man, lives by the grace of reflex arcs, heredity and environment. Self-consciousness awakes in the empirical realm, in the 'me' and not in the 'I'. In this domain 'other' determines the 'me'; the 'I' seldom, if ever, determines 'other'. Choice is abnormal and the self not free. The status of selfhood has not yet been remade by a

free contract. The business of self-life, however, is to translate the empirical into the spiritual; it means the navigation of the stream of life to its very source. All are prodigals living in the far country of spatial selfhood. We feed on the husks of transient experience. The purpose of education, religion and government is to help a man to come to himself. This finding process is retarded by too many external contrivances; it is accelerated by insistence on the dynamic reality of the inner self. He who has found his way through the crust of his outer self to the core of inner reality becomes a living artist. The sphere may be humble but it can never again become merely mechanical. The increment may be small, but a unique contribution is made to society. The course of history has received a significant impetus. Such an individual makes the world appreciably other than it would have been without his existence. He is a real creative genius. A quotation at this point may epitomize the thought.

"Freedom is therefore a fact, and among the facts which we observe there is none clearer. All the difficulties of the problem, and the problem itself, arise from the desire to endow duration with the same attributes as extensity, to interpret a succession by a simultaneity, and to express the idea of freedom in a language into which it is obviously untranslatable, . . . But the moments at which we thus grasp ourselves are rare, and that is just why we are rarely free. The greater part of the time we live outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost, a colourless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous space. Hence our life unfolds in space rather than in time; we live for the external world rather than for ourselves; we speak rather than think; we 'are acted' rather than act ourselves. To act freely is to recover possession of oneself, and to get back into pure duration."⁹

If the above delineation reveals the true nature of the 'many', it may be asked, what has become of the 'One'? Has not the Infinite been impeached? The answer of course is, no. It must be admitted, however, that in finding the 'One' *via* the 'many', our conception of the Infinite is different from what it would be if the process had been reversed. God in creating selves on whom He has bestowed some creative causation, has in a sense limited Himself. But it is a self-limitation and this

⁹ H. Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 221, 231.

clearly implies that He is never circumscribed by any thing external to Himself. He does not fractionate Himself into His world. The relation between Creator and creature is never subtractive. Some of the future volitions of free agents are not the subject of knowledge and, therefore, omniscience does not apply to them. And still God rules the world, and carries His plan to its culmination. The total possibilities are fixed but they are always in excess of the actualities. This gives a limited but a real scope for human initiative and freedom. Each has some talent and some creative opportunity. Each may hinder or help the plan of God, though none has sufficient power wholly to thwart His final purpose.

"Foreknowledge of the contingent," says Martineau, "is not a perfection, and if, rather than have a reign of universal necessity and stereotyped futurity, He willed, in order to prepare scope for a gift of moral freedom, to set up a range of alternative possibilities, He could but render some knowledge conditional for the sake of making any righteousness attainable; leaving enough that is determinate for science; and enough that is indeterminate, for character."¹⁰

With this conception of selfhood it is also significant to observe that the enigma of sin becomes rationally explicable. Finitude means frailty, and thus the possibility of evil. Though in an infinitely good God sin is inconceivable, it is entirely compatible with the existence of a finite creature. Evil as a misuse of talents, given to a free moral agent, violates neither the perfection nor the omnipotence of the Deity.

In the criticism of theological determinism it was submitted that the *ought*, which is indispensable to Christian ethics, could not be grounded in a strictly "closed universe." No matter what the obligatory ideal may be, to say that I *ought* to conform, presupposes ability to do so. What ought to be can be. The demand of oughtness is firmly grounded in the new conception of selfhood because the self can creatively respond to the lure of an ethical ideal. Each self contains the potentialities of many characters—good, bad, and indifferent. The soul is full, as James has it, of "simultaneous possibilities." The imperative voice is a challenge to actualize only the best. And this challenge is not mockery because each self has some unique responsive power.

¹⁰ *A study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 279.

VI—CONCLUSION

The ultimate purpose of our study has been to find a basic principle for the solution of the many practical problems which confront the thoughtful student of modern life. The transitional character of the present age makes the need of such a principle doubly imperative. The reconstruction of social institutions is the demand of the hour. Shall the work proceed in the direction of individualism or paternalism?

The true answer can be given only if we have a true knowledge of the nature of the individual selves which constitute the social groups. Science and deterministic theology, by interpreting the self as an entity directly or indirectly determined by 'other,' paralyze initiation and place a high premium on collectivistic methods. The one makes the self the organized resultant of physical moments; the other makes it the product of physical plus spiritual moments. In both cases the self has no inherent creative possibilities. Ultimately all is given and determined by external influence. Evidence has been adduced, however, to show that these two prevailing schools misrepresent the real nature of the self. The individual is more than the sum of all external contributions. These increments largely condition the operations of the self but they are never the sole ground of its distinctive activities. The *vis* which constructs the mental and moral life of the individual is not entirely traceable to antecedents; for each self is *sui generis*, and is itself the ultimate ground of its real emanations. Talents, position, and opportunity vary greatly among men; but each has power to recreate his environment and to create out of the plastic element of his nature a finished piece of reality.

This conception of the self becomes our guiding principle. It will guard against a chaotic individualism as well as a petrifying paternalism. The pure Ego remains barren until it is projected into spatial and social relations. This objectifying process is helped or hindered by the conditions which obtain in the body politic. Increased restrictions are sanctioned as long

as they tend to enhance individual freedom. The real purpose of restraint is to permit the individual to realize both his social and super-social possibilities. The church and the school can hasten the realization of this ideal by proclaiming the GOSPEL OF CREATIVE SELFHOOD.



